Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis has exacerbated the need to understand and monitor the systemic risk. The eurozone case is especially interesting given the diverse set of countries and the nature of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
With the advent of euro, the EMU saw a rapid growth in the financial sector fostered by the monetary policy convergence. But the structure of the financial sector within countries has its own legacies and varies considerably. In the case of Germany, Finland and the Netherlands, the total banking assets are quite concentrated, while in Italy, Greece, France and Austria, the assets are distributed quite equitably. Figure 1 suitably summarizes this information by plotting the relative size of financial institutions (by total assets) for all EMU countries, where the size of the biggest firm is normalized to one. In some countries, all financial services are only provided by banks, while other have specialized mortgage banks, pension and insurance companies. The economic dependence on financial sector and total assets managed also varies drastically within EMU countries (Figure 2 ). Consider the case of Luxembourg, where the total financial assets under management is roughly twenty five times the GDP 1 while, in Greece, Italy and Finland, this multiple is less than three. Given the existence of deposit insurance at country level, bank defaults can transfer huge contingent liabilities on sovereign's balance sheets. It is also important from the point of view of EMU structure. As banks use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with the ECB but their governments only partially back up any losses, in case the banks are unable to repurchase the bonds. This can shift additional liability to sovereign's balance sheets in case of domestic bank failure. The banking regulation is currently at the national level and governments have political incentives to save domestic banks.
The basic idea of the paper is to take one structural market-based forward looking indicator and gauge its performance in a cross sectional setting. This basic risk indicator should: (1) identify the existing balance sheet mismatch; (2) incorporate uncertainty using some forward looking market measure and (3) provide quantifiable risk indicators to measure risk exposures (Gapen et al. (2005) ) It is possible, had regulators paid greater attention to these country specific buildup of risk which this paper focuses, they might have done better and earlier to mitigate the extent and impact of crisis.
We use data for a representative set of listed financial firms in each EMU country from the end of 2004 till mid 2013, documenting the evolution of one standard CCA market-based risk measure -"distance-to-default" (DtD) -and examining its performance in cross-sectional econometric models of sovereign and banking sector performance and their linkages. The central questions addressed here are (i) does this systemic risk measure provide useful information on the buildup of risk in financial sector?; (ii) does it disentangle the structural differences in financial sector across countries?; (iii) does there exist a strong interlink between sovereigns financial stress?; (iv) does it provide useful insight about the market sentiments? and (v) can it perform better as a forecasting indicator than regulatory and accounting based measures of prudential risk?
As it turns out, DtD is a quite simple, convenient and intuitive forward looking risk measure. The level of DtD does not extricate the countries based on the structural differences in their financial sectors, but provides a good measure of inter-linkage. The market sentiments indicators are highly correlated with DtD, but Granger causality test reveals no systemic component.
The contribution of this paper is four fold: (1) we use one of the most comprehensive representative databases for EMU financial sector; (2) the study tries to understand the link between country specific buildup of systemic risk with country specific market sentiments; (3) we are not neglecting the banking sector of smaller countries, which may not be relevant at EMU level but will be relevant at country level; and (4) this simple one-period contingent claim model helps us understand the changes in capital structure of banking sector which in turn will suggest the risk-shifting behavior of banks and the readiness of sovereigns to stand sudden catastrophe.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature that employs similar contingent claims framework to assess bank fragility and buildup of systemic risk. Section 3 offers a detailed account of the methodology used to construct, analyze and interpret the DtD indicator. Section 4 describes the sample data and calibration of individual and aggregate DtD series. Section 5 first documents the behavior of returns, volatility and DtD for each EMU country. It then analyzes the joint behavior of returns, volatility and DtD in the whole EMU financial sector and presents some cross-sectional econometric analysis to gauge the predictive ability of the aggregate DtD indicator in measuring the build-up of financial stress and market sentiments. Section 6 draws conclusions.
Literature survey
The traditional approach to assess the financial health of a firm has been based on balance sheet based information. Certain accounting ratios were identified that could measure and differentiate the financial well being of firms (Altman (1968) ; Ohlson (1980); Zmijewski (1984) ). These papers typically employ multivariate discriminant analysis and multinomial choice models to estimate the default probability. However the consensus on the accuracy and prediction achieved is relatively low (see Altman and Katz (1976) ; Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) ; Blume et al. (1998) ). These models have generally been criticized on three grounds: (1) the absence of a underlying theoretical model; (2) the timeliness of information 2 and (3) the lack of uncertainty or forward looking component. The methodology also introduces sample selection bias generating inconsistent coefficient estimates (Shumway (2001) ; Chava and Jarrow (2004) ; Susan et al. (2012) ).
The contingent claims model of Merton (1974) answers some of these criticisms. It provides a structural underpinning and combines market-based and accounting information to obtain a comprehensive set of company financial risk indicators, e.g: DtD, probabilities of default, credit spreads, etc. The basic model is based on the priority structure of balance sheet liabilities and uses standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula to value the junior claims as call option on firms' value with the value of senior claims as default barrier. It has been widely applied for assessing the ability of corporates, banks and sovereigns to service their debt. Banking applications follow CCA by interpreting a bank's equity a call option on bank's value given the limited liability of shareholders. This approach was further refined by Vasicek (1984) and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is applied professionally at Moody's KMV to predict default.
Several papers have examined the usefulness of DtD as a tool for predicting corporate and bank failure (Kealhofer (2003) ; Oderda et al. (2003) ; Vassalou and Yuhang (2004) ; Gropp et al. (2006) ; Harada et al. (2010) ; Susan et al. (2012) ). They found DtD as a powerful measure to predict bankruptcy and rating downgrades. In parallel, comparative analysis of accounting based measures and DtD (Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) ), suggest that the DtD can be a powerful proxy to determine default. Campbell et al. (2008) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) incorporate a hazard modeling approach using both accounting as well as market variables in their estimation. They find that the DtD measure has relatively little explanatory power once they include other variables in their models. Campbell et al. (2011) identify an alternative set of market measures such as price levels, volatility of returns, equity to book ratio and profitability that enhance the predictive power of the models to match real world probabilities of default. (Rochet and Tirole (1996) ), financial system consolidation (De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) ), VaR -induced herding behavior in bank trading patterns (Jorion (2006) ), and the opaque and largely unregulated hedge funds (Chan et al. (2006) ; Kambhu et al. (2007) ) and (3) to develop systemic risk measures for monitoring purposes. We intend to advance the third strand of literature with our current study. This approach will help supplement the existing methodologies that failed to capture vulnerabilities prior to this crisis.
In practice, the extension of DtD series as system wide indicator suffer two major issues: (1) how individual banks data can be aggregated as system wide representation and (2) at what level they should be aggregated? We follow Harada and Ito (2008) and Harada et al. (2010) which provided empirical evidence of DtD usefulness to detect bank default risks. The systemic risk indicator in this case was an average of individual DtD series. This approach offers relative risk measures and is very attractive in terms of policy advise. However, this aggregation method ignores the joint distribution properties. In Gray et al. (2007) , , Duggar and Mitra (2007) , and Gray and Jobst (2013) ), authors provide further extensions to incorporate inter-linkages using rolling correlations or extreme value theory and developed extensions to analyze a wide range of macro-financial issues. This paper will remain silent on these issues. Instead we will try to investigate the linkages based on the weighted and unweighted average DtD indicators.
In recent literature, Gray and Malone (2008) and Saldias (2013) have argued that option based volatility can improve the performance of DtD and overcome some of the shortcomings originated in its assumptions on the returns distributions. Given that we want to discriminate the banking structure among EMU countries, we will shy away from using index volatility. Instead, we will construct our own measure of volatility based on historical returns series for each country. This ignores information based on index options (future correlations and skews) but is more appropriate for our analysis.
Contingent claim analysis
Contingent claim analysis has its genesis in Merton's general derivative pricing model (Merton (1974) ) in a framework that combines market based and balance sheet information to obtain a set of financial risk indicators. In this context, the liabilities are viewed as contingent claims against assets with payoff determined by seniority. Since equity has limited liability and has the residual claim on the assets after all other obligations have been met, it becomes an implicit call option on the market value of assets with strike price defined by the debt barrier. Figure 3 shows this relationship graphically.
Figure 3 Equity as call option
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To understand the key relationship between the value of total assets and the promised payments, Figure 4 plots the probability distribution of assets value at time t 1 assuming that the asset return process is dA/A = µ A dt + σ A (t), where µ A is the drift rate or asset return, σ A is equal to the standard deviation of the asset return, and is normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance. Default occurs when assets fall to or below 6
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But the asset-return probability distribution used to value contingent claims is not the "actual" one but the "risk-adjusted" or "risk-neutral" probability distribution, which substitutes the risk-free interest rate for the actual expected return in the distribution. This risk-neutral distribution is the dashed line in Figure 4 with expected rate of return r, the risk-free rate. Thus, the "risk-adjusted" probability of default calculated using the "riskneutral" distribution is larger than the actual probability of default for all assets which have an actual expected return (µ) greater than the risk-free rate r (that is, a positive risk premium). 
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Derivation of individual DtD
Given this background, DtD cannot be measured directly. Rather it is recovered implicitly from observed measures of bank liabilities and of the market prices of those liabilities. Since equity is a junior claim to debt, the former can be modeled and calculated as a standard call option on the assets with exercise price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the literature as distress barrier or default barrier).
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian Motion, the application of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula (Black and Scholes (1973) ) yields the closed-form expression of equity E as an European call option on the bank's assets A at maturity T:
where r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, and N( * ) is the cumulative normal distribution. The values of d 1 and d 2 are expressed as
We use an additional equation that links the asset volatility σ A to the volatility of the bank's equity σ E by applying Ito's Lemma:
The Merton model uses Eqs. 2 and 5 to obtain the implied asset value A and volatility σ A , which are not observable and must be estimated by inverting the two relationships. Once a numerical solutions for A and σ A are found, the DtD is calculated as:
Using this model to quantify DtD requires some practical compromises. Real debt contracts are not all written with a single terminal date. To overcome this problem, a common procedure used by Moody's KMV and also employed here, is to adopt a one year horizon T, but to weight longer term debt of maturity greater than one year at only 50% of face value. We also use the market value of firms' equity, average quarterly historical volatilities as equity price return volatility and 10-year government bond yields as the risk-free interest rate.
Sensitivity of DtD
DtD can be interpreted as how many standard deviations the asset value of the firm is away from the debt of the firm. Three key inputs to calculating the DtD for a firm are market capitalization, debt level, and the volatility of equity. This implies that the DtD is influenced by the leverage ratio and volatility of the firm. A lower value of DtD can be obtained either because the leverage of the firm is high or because the volatility is high or both. Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of DtD to each of these inputs across varying levels of leverage and equity volatility.
It should be noted that when overall market volatility is high, it is likely that even small changes in the leverage will cause large changes in the DtD. Thus, in episodes of distress when systemic volatility reached peak levels, the DtD react much more sharply to even small changes in leverage. Whereas the same amount of change during calm period would decrease DtD slightly (Susan et al. (2012) ). 
Data
This section introduces the bank sample used to compute the individual firm specific and aggregate country specific DtD time series. For the analysis, we will consider countries which share the common currency Euro from the very start (1999) except for Greece which joined in 2001. This choice will ensure that the selected banks share the same accounting currency. It doesn't mean that they have similar exchange rate risk profile since the level of foreign currency exposure will depend on the asset profile of their respective banks.
The sample
The sample used to compute the DtD and aggregate DtD series is based on all monetary financial institutions listed in EMU countries. This includes all monetary firms whose share are publicly listed and traded between the last quarter of 2004 till the second quarter of 2013. We have also considered firms which got listed/delisted in the reference period. The idea is to create The data selection methodology is as follows: Firstly, an exhaustive list of all listed/delisted financial institution are selected from Bankscope which provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for banking companies. We got a total of 199 firms in western Europe. Secondly, banks based in countries which are not part of this study have been dropped out. Thirdly, we removed credit institutions which are pure-play insurance, pension or mortgage banks. To formalize this decision, we have used Datastream as an additional source of information. Finally, firms which got listed, delisted, nationalized or suffered any other relevant corporate actions have been considered in the data set till they stopped trading at public exchanges. Table 1 summarizes the list of countries and total number of banks considered for the DtD analysis. One should note that due to the varying number of bankruptcy, M&A, nationalization or other corporate actions, the number of firms in the sample will change year-on-year, both for the full sample and for each individual country (Figure 6 ). The comprehensive list of firms used in this analysis is summarized in Table 2 . The period for which each firm got traded is also available but is not documented to save space. This information is available upon request. 
Calibration of DtD series
To compute individual DtD, we used information on the risk-free rate, the market value of equity, and short-term liability (book value). Default barrier was calculated as the sum of 100% of deposits and short term debt and 50% of long term liability. Daily share price data and number of shares for each firm were downloaded from Datastream, and used to compute market capitalization and volatility. Volatility was calculated as the standard deviation of logarithmic returns for the past 66 trading days (3 months) prior to each accounting date. Share prices and interest rates were all downloaded in the currency used by each bank for its annual reporting.
Calculations of distance to default were made on a quarterly basis. While most of the institutions report their numbers quarterly, many other institutions only reported on a half-yearly basis for most of the period 2004 − 2013. To have data consistency, balance sheet variables are interpolated for intermediate dates using cubic splines. The list of variable used for the analysis are summarized in Table 3 .
Aggregating DtD series
The unweighted average DtD (aDtD) is obtained by taking the simple average across all credit institutions headquartered in a particular country and is computed as:
DtD j,t
13 where DtD j,t is the DtD of firm j at time t .
The aggregate weighted average DtD (wDtD) is based on the market capital weighted average of DtD for all credit institutions headquartered in a particular country and is represented as:
where DtD j,t is thel DtD of firm j and w j,t is the individual market-capital weights at time t.
Analysis
To put the data into perspective, we summarize the behavior of returns, volatility and DtD at country level for all EMU countries under study. Figure 7 plots the index level based on average logarithmic returns of all firms in the sample for a particular country. Firms which dropped out (due to some corporate action) during a particular quarter have been removed from the average calculations at the next period. This methodology creates an upward bias in the returns index level and should be interpreted carefully. To check the variation in data, Figure 8 shows the evolution of market capitalization weighted returns index at country level. Both indices are normalized to 100 for all countries at the end of the third quarter in 2004. Figure 9 presents unweighted equity price volatility 5 aggregated at country level for all EMU countries under study. As can be seen, the market volatility was quite stable till mid 2008 but saw a knee jerk reaction once Lehman Brothers collapsed. Interestingly, the price decline started from the beginning of 2008 but the market volatility remained stable. Some of the countries (Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands) saw huge spikes, while the peripheral countries registered a relatively calm period. One possible reason of the excess volatility may be the higher integration and exposure to international financial markets. Average volatility level of small countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands and Austria) are relatively high in general. pre-crisis level. European sovereign debt crisis and loss of market confidence may be some possible explanation why the average volatility in peripheral countries remains relatively high. The shift in the mean volatility level also need to be interpreted cautiously. Analysis based on market capitalization weighted volatility suggests similar findings. Figure 10 show the behavior of unweighted and weighted average DtD for each country while Table 5 reports the summary statistics. It should be noted that average level of DtD is quite low for Greece and Ireland which suggests their vulnerability to sudden and unexpected shocks. Any increase in market volatility will lead to insolvency very fast. 
Preliminary results
To visualize aDtD as a potential indicator of future financial stress, we examine the variation in aDtD with the broad market indicators of returns and volatility. Figure 11 -12 plot aDtD, average returns and average volatility for each EMU country. The left axis represents the returns index level while the right axis represents the annualized volatility in percentage. The level of aDtD is scaled to show the general trend and variation with time.
The graphs suggest that aDtD started deteriorating for most countries between 2006-07, except for France and the Netherlands. It should be noted that aDtD started declining when average returns were showing an upward trend. It also indicates very strong correlations with the average volatility which does undermine its predictive ability. A similar graph based on weighted indices suggests analogous findings, which encourages us to test its predictive ability. 
Correlations
We use three correlations measures (parametric: Pearson, and non-parametric: Spearman and Kendell) in our analysis to avoid any bias rising from potential non-linear dependencies and to ascertain the robustness of our findings. Since the Pearson measure is the most commonly used, we report our findings based on Pearson correlations only, but they are also robust based on the Spearman and Kendell correlations as well.
For each correlations measure, we first estimate the pair-wise correlations among all the aggregated sovereign DtD series (Table 6 ) and then take the mean and median of these pair correlations to obtain some inferences. The average correlation among indices is very high which suggests a common risk factor. This may also be because of the small sample that contains two crisis episodes. To understand the time varying correlation dynamics, a sighed rank test is applied to test the null hypothesis that the mean and median correlations are equal if we divide the time period in two half (pre and post crisis). The results remain consistent for varying sample periods. When we look at the initial level of DtD with the drop in DtD during the crisis (Figure 14) , the relationship seems to be positive. This suggests that the higher level of DtD experiences a relatives higher correction during this period. The average level of DtD for most EMU countries was around four. For a subset of countries -Austria, France and Italy -DtD fell quite sharply between 2007-Q2 and 2009-Q1. While for Portugal, Spain and Greece, the corrections were less than expected. 
Conclusion
By analyzing the behavior and fluctuations of a market based indicator for individual EMU countries, we find that average DtD is an intuitive, simple and convenient forward looking systemic risk measure. It shows some predictive ability 12-18 months prior to the global financial crisis for most of the countries and captures the trend as well as fluctuations in the financial markets. Moreover, it also presents very strong correlations with quarterly average historical volatility which undermines its usefulness. The average level of risk measure suggests some cross sectional differences across the financial industry. The average DtD indicator shows synchronized movements in all countries with very strong correlations, which suggests the existence of common risk factors across EMU countries. The sudden dip in average DtD for countries during time of stress can be explained by increased global volatility.
To conclude, there are various reasons for considering structural market based indicators alongside accounting/regulatory risk measure. As statistical theory suggests, when faced with two estimators for the same underlying variable, it is optimal to combine the two. Tracking country specific indices does provide some additional information related with the average risk level and the ability to withstand sudden and unexpected disruptions.
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